Congressional Research Service. April 10, 2013.
In his 2013 State of the Union Address, President Obama stated that the United States would “engage Russia to seek further reductions in our nuclear arsenals.” These reductions could include limits on strategic, nonstrategic and nondeployed nuclear weapons. Yet, arms control negotiations between the United States and Russia have stalled, leading many observers to suggest that the United States reduce its nuclear forces unilaterally, or in parallel with Russia, without negotiating a new treaty. Many in Congress have expressed concerns about this possibility, both because they question the need to reduce nuclear forces below New START levels and because they do not want the President to agree to further reductions without seeking the approval of Congress.
http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/207885.pdf [PDF format, 36 pages].
Andrew J. Shapiro, Assistant Secretary, Bureau of Political-Military Affairs. April 18, 2013.
As he starts his last week as Assistant Secretary of State for Political-Military Affairs, Mr. Shapiro deals with a few key issues. He gives a review of his 4 years at post and answers to questions on future developments.
http://fpc.state.gov/207520.htm [HTML format + Video, 33:58]
James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies (CNS).
The Obama administration’s March 15 decision to abandon development of a controversial missile defense interceptor that had angered Moscow had, for a moment, renewed hopes in Washington for a new round of US-Russia arms control negotiations. However, lingering Russian technical and political concerns about the nature and direction of the revised US missile defense plans mean that this optimism may be misplaced. Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel announced the decision to abandon the so-called “Block IIB” interceptor as part of an overall restructuring of the missile defense program. He cited development problems with the interceptor and the need to direct limited funds to focus specifically against the North Korean threat. [Note: contains copyrighted material].
Congressional Research Service. November 30, 2012.
The Obama Administration and outside analysts argue that New START will strengthen strategic stability and enhance U.S. national security. They contend that New START will contribute to U.S. nuclear nonproliferation goals by convincing other nations that the United States is serious about its obligations under the NPT. This might convince more nations to cooperate with the United States in pressuring nations who are seeking their own nuclear weapons. Critics, however, question whether the treaty serves U.S. national security interests, as Russia was likely to reduce its forces with or without an arms control agreement and because the United States and Russia no longer need arms control treaties to manage their relationship. Some also consider the U.S.-Russian arms control process to be a distraction from the more important issues on the nonproliferation agenda.
http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/201597.pdf [PDF format, 38 pages].
James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies. July 5, 2012.
The United States and the Russian Federation have engaged in bilateral and multilateral nuclear security work for more than two decades. This cooperation was launched in reaction to the break-up of the Soviet Union and the urgent need to introduce measures to secure nuclear materials and facilities in the former U.S.S.R. (FSU). Through this cooperation, both countries increased mutual confidence in the nuclear area, established regular contact between Russian and U.S. nuclear government experts and nuclear scientists, and enriched overall nuclear security technologies and procedures—all of which has ultimately led to sustainable progress in nuclear security in Russia and has benefited nuclear security in the United States and globally. [Note: contains copyrighted material].
http://cns.miis.edu/opapers/pdfs/120705_us_russia_nuclear_security_partnership.pdf [PDF format, 36 pages].